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In truth the work of science was a communal thing. 
. . . So public, so explicit.1  
 
 
 
People gave talks, asked questions, debated details 
of fact, discussed implications . . . as if they were in 
a world outside of time and space, in the imaginary 
space of pure science, surely one of the greatest 
achievements of the human spirit― a kind of 
utopian community, cozy and bright and protected.2 
 
 
 
 
                                      — Kim Stanley Robinson 
 
 
1 
 
Prior to this final offering for 2003, Poroi has published only 
special issues, focused on a single topic at a time.  More will follow 
intermittently.  But the milestone of the month has Poroi entering 
the territory where submissions over the transom determine the 
contents.  Our transom is electronic, rather than wooden, but this 
can make Poroi particularly accommodating for diverse exercises 
in scholarship.  An inclusive concern for rhetoric in culture, 
inquiry, and politics means that, as submissions warrant, Poroi 
will track intellectual developments in many directions.  With this 
issue, Poroi becomes a scholarly journal in the most open and 
ambitious way:  publishing sets of articles on assorted topics. 
 
 
2 
 
All senses of assorted apply.  Fitting the most familiar definition, 
this issue consists of “various or miscellaneous kinds” of articles.  
The first article to cross the transom came from Susan 
Zickmund at Pittsburgh.  It parses the Ayatollah Khomeini’s 
rhetoric to specify how he tapped Islamic myths and concepts in 
creating an Iranian identity powerful enough to unseat the Shah.  
Zickmund’s account of the construction of this anti-western 
movement provides a back story for our previous issue’s interest in 
the rhetorics of response to terrorist atrocities on 9/11. 
 
 
3 
 
But the next submission shifts topics, settings, and politics.  Iowa’s 
Kembrew McLeod is well on the way to becoming America’s  
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agent provocateur for Freedom of Expression.  Indeed he has 
trademarked the term to show how perverse laws of intellectual 
property are taking the United States into litigious territories of 
corporate control that undo our liberties of public and private 
speech.  McLeod inventories a range of outrages, recounts several 
of his own exploits in ironizing the institutional results, and 
ponders responses available in the popular culture.  Again there 
are telling ties to the journal’s preceding issue, where Aimee 
Carrillo Rowe and Sheena Molhotra trace the militarizing of 
popular culture in America after September 11, while Thomas 
Shevory skewers post-9/11 efforts to censor radio music and 
suppress popular resources of irony. 
 
4 
 
For something completely different, as Monty Python used to say, 
Thom Swiss and Seb Chevrel collaborate on a multimedia 
poem that readers invent for themselves.  More engaging than a 
video game, it turns into a multitude of images, feelings, and logics 
as the anticipations of writers and readers interact.  Then, from a 
wholly separate postmodern planet, comes a template for Poroi 
myth scapes.  In homage to the “mythologies” of Roland Barthes, it 
romps through a playful rebuttal to complaints that the second 
Bush Administration conducts foreign affairs as cowboy politics.  
Instead, argues the intrepid rhetorician of myth, preparations by 
the President and Defense Secretary for war in Iraq reveal the 
politics of vampire hunters. 
 
 
5 
 
Beginning with this issue, Poroi also satisfies a second sense of 
assorted.  It publishes “selected kinds, arranged in sorts or 
varieties.”  In August, Poroi announced a number of such “sorts,” 
in the form of occasional features.  Now in November, the features 
are starting to recur, turning singular contributions into 
continuing kinds.  These features amount to open forums on 
rhetoric in films, words, multimedia, inventions, strategies, myths, 
and, we expect, more.  With the present issue, in fact, the sorting 
gains additional dimensions through the Poroi Symposium.  We 
introduce this device as an occasional feature that enables two or 
more authors to address the same topics in tandem. 
 
 
6 
 
The ambition is for some of the symposia to link articles across, as 
well as within, issues.  Always the symposium contributions 
complement each other, to approach their shared concerns more 
adventurously and diversely than individual articles can manage 
on their own.  Sometimes the symposiasts cover different facets of 
a topic.  Typically they pursue disparate perspectives on some 
questions in common.  Often they debate one another directly.  In 
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principle, just about any article could provoke a symposium, 
whenever a later submission comments specifically on an earlier 
one.  Yet the symposia that begin specifically as debates are overt 
invitations for readers to become writers.  They encourage you ― 
yes, you ― to provide responses that can develop the controversy, 
by increasing what we can learn from it. 
 
7 
 
In this issue, the Poroi Symposium on the Scope of Rhetoric 
extends a debate begun in earlier books and journals.  It arises on 
the contested boundaries between rhetoric as an academic 
discipline, rhetoric of inquiry as an interdisciplinary field, rhetoric 
of culture as a movement in postmodern scholarship, and rhetoric 
in politics as a family of civic practices.  To inaugurate the 
symposium, Herbert Simons of Temple advances his case for 
“globalizing” rhetoric.  He argues that rhetoric includes far more 
than civic oratory and deliberation, and he defends the diffusion of 
rhetorical studies by almost any means throughout the academy.  
Here he answers counter-arguments that foresee bad 
consequences for rhetoric as a discipline from including rhetoric of 
science, allying with cultural studies, opening to narratologies, and 
the like.  Instead for Simons, “expansion of rhetoric’s scope beyond 
the civic arena” can mean interdisciplinary interactions that 
enhance the discipline while improving not only the many studies 
but especially the diverse practices of rhetoric.3  To globalize 
rhetoric, Simons says, is to promote the intellectual free trade that 
can maximize learning across specialties and inform deliberation 
about policies. 
 
 
8 
 
Writing from Warwick, Steve Fuller rejoins that critics of 
encompassing rhetoric are right to fear the eclipse of the 
traditional discipline.  Precisely because he pursues rhetoric of 
science, Fuller explains, he experiences how science policy needs 
rhetoric as a discipline to stay focused on public speech in the civic 
arena.  For Fuller, disciplinary rhetoric must reclaim its traditional 
role as custodian for arts crucial to the democratic public, where 
concerns of the commonwealth can be brought before all citizens 
for discussion and decision.  Like globalizing trade, globalizing 
rhetoric underbids and overwhelms small, regional, traditional 
operations ― such as the discipline that emphasizes oratory for a 
classic or democratic public.  Better than “naïve free trade” among 
innumerable enterprises of rhetoric is “strategic protection” for a 
disciplinary rhetoric that would reclaim its intellectual legacy of a 
public sphere for citizens to participate in making policies.4 
 
 9  Here, as in every Poroi conspectus, the ambition is to explore the  
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mutual implications of the surrounding contributions.  Even when 
the articles in an issue are assorted, in both of the first two senses, 
its conspectus considers how they are “matched or suited” to one 
another.  This is the word’s third main meaning.  Accordingly a 
conspectus addresses how the individual pieces fit into an 
intriguing issue of some coherence, and not just into diverse sorts 
of continuing features.  The coherence is not as tight or intentional 
as the themes for special issues or the questions for specific 
symposia.  When the contents track individual submissions, after 
all, the pieces remain assorted.  Yet a mark of a cogent journal is 
that its issues can sustain significant patterns. 
 
10 
 
For the present issue, the symposium on the scope of rhetoric 
suggests itself as a loose rubric for further reflections on all the 
submissions, and not only those by Simons and Fuller.  In a way, 
that treats the whole journal a set of test cases, and it turns this 
conspectus into a third contribution to the symposium.  It also 
makes this the place to specify the general invitation that readers 
submit their own offerings to extend symposia of greatest personal 
interest.  The scope of rhetoric can be a vital topic for Poroi, and 
the journal would welcome opportunities to publish additional 
views on it from readers in the issues ahead. 
 
 
11 
 
Like Poroi, rhetoric of inquiry has been launched as an 
intrinsically interdisciplinary field.  The idea is not to replace 
philosophy of science as an established field.  Nor is it to begin 
outside acknowledged disciplines but eventually become 
paradigmatic and institutionalized as a discrete discipline.  As 
comparative epistemology, it works across boundaries among 
fields and disciplines, rather than lodge itself in a single home.  As 
immanent epistemology, it proceeds as an aspect of many 
inquiries, rather than dictate to any as an outside authority on how 
to learn.5  And as commerce among the archipelagos of learning 
that academic disciplines can become, it encourages greater 
intellectual trade than some of the human sciences practice of 
late.6 
 
 
12 
 
This need not keep rhetoric of inquiry from cultivation at specific 
sites in the academy.  It has become a familiar enterprise in 
sociology of science, history of economics, studies of science and 
technology, rhetoric of science, and elsewhere.  Yet it prospers 
especially in the midst of the learning done by myriad practices of 
inquiry.  When Murray Edelman began his deconstruction of the 
American political spectacle by explaining how its dynamics elude 
detection by surveys and economic modeling, his rhetoric of 
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inquiry instructed his analysis of the liberal symbolism that 
pervades news in the United States.7  When Stephen Jay Gould 
made criticisms of methods by biologists and psychologists into 
cornerstones for his own studies of evolution, learning, and time, 
his rhetoric of inquiry informed his ideas about punctuated 
equilibria, human intelligence, and natural history.8  When 
Michael Pollan grounded his studies of virtue in gardening, truth 
in architecture, and desire in botany, his rhetorical invention was 
part, if not parcel, of his research strategy.9  Even when Hannah 
Arendt revived republicanism and theorized totalitarianism, her 
rhetorical analysis of social science and history fed her accounts of 
how scholars European and American could misconceive almost 
altogether the beginnings and ends of western civilization.10 
 
13 
 
These models for rhetorical work of significance to scholars and 
larger publics have no programmatic connection to rhetoric of 
inquiry as an interdisciplinary project or to civic rhetoric as a 
disciplinary tradition.  When asked about the family resemblance 
of principles and devices, Gould and Edelman acknowledged to me 
some kinship with rhetoric of inquiry as an emerging constellation 
of topics and tropes.  But Arendt drew crucially from classical 
rhetoric without ever saying so; and Pollan’s inspiration seems to 
come from Nietzschean sources in literature, culture, and ecology 
rather than anything academically rhetorical.  To revive and 
advance their sorts of rhetoric, Kenneth Burke and Wayne Booth 
have done literary theory, whereas Robert Pirsig has produced 
popular novels, and Pollan has been publishing journalistic 
essays.11  How might these forms, ties, or matter?  When a post-
classical enterprise such as rhetoric of inquiry launches itself in 
alliance with stars such as Stephen Toulmin, Thomas Kuhn, Jean 
Elshtain, Richard Rorty, and Clifford Geertz, does this torpedo a 
traditional discipline of rhetoric?  Legitimate it?  Enlarge it? 
 
 
14 
 
The exchange between Simons and Fuller turns in part on what is 
good for disciplinized rhetoricians.  Principles of ethos suggest that 
I stand aside from such questions, and I proffer no advice on them, 
but I would share an observation.  The main glimpses of insider 
experience that have been open to me for the fields of rhetoric and 
communication studies arise from teaching Ph.D. students and 
attending conferences linked with disciplinized rhetoric.  These 
experiences reverberate with surprising discontents by specialists 
in the field.12 
 
 
15 
 
The discontents seem endemic, but they assume different forms 
from one generation of scholars to the next.  When a host of  
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academicians who were doing rhetorical analysis but not exactly 
recognizing this gathered in 1984 with several specialists from the 
traditional discipline, the specialists raised most of the objections.  
Unsurprisingly they worried (with Fuller) that interlopers might 
hijack or overwhelm rhetoric:  distorting and destroying it almost 
unaware.  But the surprise was the warning to outsiders that 
sustained, detailed attention to rhetoric could and probably would 
harm their separate studies:  discrediting, distracting, or distorting 
them.13 
 
16 
 
A decade later, it was the disciplinary rhetoricians among the 
graduate students in Iowa’s early courses on rhetoric of inquiry 
who held that rhetorical analysis is awkward or impossible to 
perform on their fields, because rhetorical scholarship somehow 
has no substance or object of the sorts defining for disciplines of 
history, economy, literature, or biology.  Rhetoric is intrinsically 
secondary and parasitic, these disciplinarians were insisting, with 
no subject matter in the sense that helps to demarcate other 
inquiries. 
 
 
17 
 
In the ten years between, Robert Hariman had investigated the 
“marginality” of rhetoric; and Dilip Gaonkar had explained how 
rhetoric could not escape its “mereness,” its status as the 
Derridean “supplement” to other inquiries and practices.14  The 
Gaonkar stricture seemed to me particularly strange, or sly, since 
the Derridean supplement is the “mere” addition that changes 
everything.15  Still this has not seemed the spin that most 
specialists sense in the move.  If such largely agreeable ideas about 
rhetoric could exhilarate a marginal sophist like me, by helping to 
explain the powers and limits of traditional, civic rhetoric, similar 
notions seem to distress and depress all too many in the 
discipline.16  Yet the discipline appears to take a tenacious pride in 
its discontents; and they can strike an interloper as sometime 
virtues, if not competitive advantages. 
 
 
18 
 
One message from the margins, where rhetoric of inquiry 
compares various fields, is that rhetoric is not alone in its 
discontents.  Nor is it unique in the grandiose ambitions that 
several of the discontents double and shadow.  Rhetoric of inquiry 
makes some disciplinary rhetoricians uneasy because it contests 
the usual disdain for rhetoric as “mere,” “secondary,” or 
“seductive.”  Rhetoric matters, it maintains, and rhetoric of inquiry 
details how from one situation to another.  But this is not to set up 
rhetoric for a fall, by exalting it as royalty among the sciences.  
Instead it is to appreciate what the distinctive tools, topics, 
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institutions, and perspectives from rhetoric can teach us about 
inquiries, cultures, politics, and more.  It is to learn what we can 
from analyzing rhetoric all over. 
 
19 
 
Need that be disciplinary rhetoric?  There are many rhetorics.  
Most of these studies of principles and devices for persuasion 
appear in the discipline, even though not all are obvious offshoots 
of classical oratory.  To do rhetoric of inquiry, the analyst needs to 
know at least one rhetoric inside and out.  Introducing graduate 
students to rhetoric of inquiry, Deirdre McCloskey and I asked 
each to learn one as a platform for proceeding.  With some twenty 
students, we had no trouble identifying that many rhetorics of 
interest.  Only a few are overtly classical, but all tie in some 
important way to the classical preoccupation with public 
persuasion, and all have much to contribute:  Aristotle,17 Cicero,18 
Quintilian,19 George Campbell,20 Richard Lanham,21 Chaim 
Perelman,22 Paul Ricoeur,23 Wayne Booth,24 Kenneth Burke,25 
Hayden White,26 Friedrich Nietzsche,27 Jacques Derrida,28 
Michael Shapiro,29 Roland Barthes,30 Umberto Eco,31 Fredric 
Jameson,32 Michael McGee,33 Stanley Fish,34 Northrop Frye,35 
and Walter Fisher.36  These days, moreover, even a first seminar 
on rhetoric of inquiry would do well in addition to encompass 
digital and visual rhetorics.37  How is that for a learning 
environment rich in resources? 
 
 
20 
 
The proliferation of rhetorics seems in some quarters a source of 
disciplinary discontent.  By the lights of Kuhn, it can be a sign that 
the would-be discipline of rhetoric lacks a crowning and 
controlling paradigm.  By the fears of Fuller, it can be a door that 
other fields open to take away legitimacy and power from the 
public interest promoted by traditional rhetoric.  Yet this also can 
be a door for the instructive trade in learning that Simons sees, 
and it can be a sign that rhetoric is relevant far beyond the classical 
public. 
 
 
21 
 
Can this become an intellectual imperialism?  Sort of, sometimes . . 
.  But more precisely, it is apt to be akin (as Simons and Fuller 
agree) to the ambition for expansion that characterizes a 
globalizing capitalism.  Again, though, this is an endeavor not only 
of rhetoric but of many other fields and disciplines.  We can do 
worse than compare current scholars, especially the stars that 
multiversities seek, to entrepreneurs ― and their fields to firms 
intent on entering new markets while expanding their shares in 
existing ones.  Gary Becker and rational-choice theorists have 
bestowed on us the decidedly mixed blessing of the economics of 
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everything.38  Often these scholars take their distinctive principles 
and devices for analysis too far to stay plausible, but we can still 
learn a lot from their adventures in rethinking the world.  The 
same goes for Derridean, Marxian, psychoanalytic, evolutionary, 
cybernetic, and other prospectively imperial projects of inquiry, 
some disciplinized and some not. 
 
22 
 
Even to comprehend their topics, fields and methods must reach 
beyond familiar regions.  Eventually these must push into strange 
places, even territories long claimed by other inquiries,  to learn 
what does and does not provoke frissons of recognition and 
remapping.  One of our main protections against proto-
hegemonies is a continuing competition among explanatory 
principles and emerging explanations.  Another is our postmodern 
skepticism for meta-narratives.  A third is our increasing, 
specifically rhetorical, capacity to engage and compare diverse 
epistemologies. 
 
 
23 
 
A related discontent identified by Fuller is the supposedly ensuing 
disjunction between graduate and undergraduate courses on 
rhetoric.39  Undergraduates learn public speaking and technical 
writing; graduate students learn discourse analysis that dispels 
myths of public speech and accurate communication.40  Again, 
similar disjunctions of curricula ― whether good, bad, or 
indifferent ― pervade the humanities and social sciences.  Fuller 
thinks the sanity of professors can depend on the graduate 
seminars.  Notoriously, however, these dismay many students who 
loved as undergraduates to study economies, polities, literatures, 
or speeches only to find their graduate seminars turning instead 
into mathematics, statistics, hermeneutics, and semiotics.41  Do 
the disconnections come from unfettered intellectual trade?  From 
undue protectionism?  Not exactly, although the wages of 
specialization deserve closer scrutiny on another occasion. 
 
 
24 
 
Fuller’s specific concerns in this connection are a “shrinkage of the 
public sphere” within current polities plus an eclipse of the 
classical public within the distended rhetorical studies that result 
from globalizing rhetoric in the Simons sense.42  The shrinking 
sphere of public decision is a discontent among academicians in 
many disciplines, and discontent at the eclipse of classically public 
rhetoric is especially prominent among scholars of public address.  
Both these discontents suppose the current salience of the classical 
public:  central, singular, deliberative, quietly elite, and 
empowered to coordinate (rather than conduct) all sorts of 
activities in a free and responsible commonwealth.  Both assume 
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that the classical public can be, must be, perhaps already has been 
democratized to open it to virtually everybody.  Notwithstanding 
the drive to protect rhetoric as a specialty, both even presume that 
specialists are public enemy number one, at least for the classic yet 
somehow democratized public. 
 
25 
 
Here I am more on home ground as a scholar of politics; and to 
me, both discontents are somewhat misbegotten.  Their 
presuppositions are more wrong than right, leaving their practical 
implications unfortunate for politics, education, and scholarship. 
 
 
26 
 
In overly stark terms, we could say that classical publics have less 
to do with democracies than many scholars suppose, whether we 
are talking about modern theory or present practice.  As a 
principle of political realism, this has been the disciplinary 
judgment of political science for the last century.  It holds that the 
political tradition of democracy is recent rather than ancient, and 
it is not readily compatible with the republican-rhetorical tradition 
that springs from the Romans or perhaps even the Sophists in 
classical Greece.  As Alexis de Tocqueville noticed, democracy is 
more a nineteenth-century invention that involves equality, 
inclusion, participation, and popular rule.43  It distrusts republican 
principles such as leadership, exclusion, ambition, and virtuosity. 
 
 
27 
 
The liberal-democratic device of representation does not eradicate 
the contrast or split the difference so much as it generates 
oxymorons like mass publics, aristocracies of merit, national self-
determination, and nations by creed rather than birth.  These are 
not impossibilities, and they need not be perversities.  Eventually 
they might become parts of what we mean by “democracy.”  But 
they are not particularly republican.  They mean voting more than 
voicing, log-rolling more than deliberation, values more than 
virtues, and far more emphasis on private than public affairs. 
 
 
28 
 
They also open and pluralize the classical public.  To staunch 
republicans, this is to deny or dissolve the one true public 
responsible for managing the commonwealth.  Yet democrats and 
postmodernists see plural and partial publics disseminated all 
around us rather than some single, central, and (in principle) all-
powerful “public sphere.”44  Fuller argues that “Literary criticism, 
cultural studies, and social theory can all survive without a 
foundational sense of ‘the public,’ but it is not clear that rhetoric 
can.”45  Even were this right, and I have doubts in both directions, 
the question would remain how much to pack into that definite 
article.  Should disciplinary rhetoric let it singularize and 
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centralize “public speech,” to the point of irrelevance to most of 
our actual politics, cultures, or inquiries?  The republican tradition 
of rhetoric is more resourceful than that.  After all, it didn’t exactly 
spring whole from “the classical public” in practice.  Indeed 
specialists in public address have every reason to recognize that 
few ancient settings for oratory embody the idols of the public that 
emerge later in the academy. 
 
29 
 
In this connection, Fuller slams the limited ambition implicit in 
the Simons celebration of the Temple Issues Forum.  It has no 
prospect of impact on “the public sphere.”  The same could be said 
of the AARST Science Policy Forum that Fuller promotes.  “Cynics 
may dismiss such an exercise as ultimately ineffectual,” he 
concedes, “in a political culture where issues like global warming 
are ultimately decided by legislators several degrees of separation 
from the rhetorical activists.”46  To notice the lack of effect hardly 
seems to require cynicism; merely facing facts should suffice.  (Of 
course, there might be better reasons than public impact for such 
initiatives.) 
 
 
30 
 
Fuller seems to think that scientists and other specialists shrink 
“the public sphere” by turning properly public issues into privately 
technical questions for address by experts only.  He says of 
Intelligent Design Theory that “it would be difficult to point to 
another movement with such explicit links to the rhetorical 
tradition that in recent years has done so much to reclaim for 
public deliberation matters previously ceded to technical 
expertise.”47  The scholars are legion who think that experts dictate 
policy to public representatives.  ’Taint so.  To study policymaking 
is to find politicians using experts, far more than the other way 
around, and to watch politicians prevail when experts dissent.  
Fuller talks about the American lack of policy response to global 
warming.  Could there be a clearer case of politicians trumping 
experts in making public policy?  The trouble here is not some 
technical takeover of truly public issues; it is that we fail so far to 
heed politically what we learn technically.  In instances where 
something like Fuller’s “public sphere” does “shrink,” the main 
American causes are interest politics of economic sorts, not power 
grabs by experts and technicians.48  Rhetorical analysts might pay 
more attention to what experts on politics learn about the actual 
arenas for debate, deliberation, decision, and action.49 
 
 
31 
 
“With global warming,” says Fuller, “the main obstacles to effective 
rhetorical activism involve the status of the activists as relatively 
minor players in the U.S. Congressional arena.  Hence rhetorical  
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activists have a better chance of influencing aspects of governance 
devolved to state and local levels.”50  But why focus on Congress?  
Arguably the presidency and the courts have been and can be 
much more important ― even rhetorically ― for attention to global 
warming and other environmental concerns.  To treat Congress as 
the public arena or forum is manifestly inadequate for American 
politics ― from the beginning, let alone for the present.51 
 
32 
 
Notice, too, the public-democratic naïveté on state and local 
government in the United States.  To devolve environmental (or 
other) policies to the state and local levels, as Fuller wants, is to do 
what industrial foes of green politics have sought assiduously.  
These anti-environmental interests dominate state and local 
politics even more effectively than national politics.  At state and 
local levels, the media coverage crucial to green politics is more 
spotty and subject to local boosterism.  As green activists know, 
dynamics of NIMBY, races to the bottom, environmental racism 
and classism, erratic expertise, and the proliferation of the venues 
needed for victory all recommend national over state and local 
settings for the pursuit of environmental persuasion in America.52  
Idolize the public and miss the politics? 
 
 
33 
 
More baffling still is why anyone who privileges the republican 
tradition of civic rhetoric would want to de-emphasize or de-
legitimate rhetoric of inquiry in general or rhetoric of science in 
particular.  The classical public might not exactly exist in current 
politics, and it might never have been practiced precisely as such in 
ancient Greece or Rome, but the ideals of discourse and action 
celebrated by civic republicans do find rough embodiments in “the 
republic of science.”53  The epigraphs from Kim Stanley Robinson 
say it in a nutshell, but some of the details of modern sciences as 
institutionalized inquiries are worth comparing to the dream that 
is Fuller’s public: 
 
 
 
 
for any given problem in science, the people who were 
actually out there on the edge making progress 
constituted a special group, of a few hundred at most 
― often with a core group of synthesists and 
innovators that was no more than a dozen people ― 
inventing a new jargon of their dialect to convey their 
new insights, arguing over results, suggesting new 
avenues of investigation, giving each other jobs in 
labs, meeting at conferences specially devoted to the 
topic ― talking to each other, in all the media there 
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were.  And there in the labs and the conference bars 
the work went forward, as a dialogue of people who 
understood the issues, and did the sheer hard work of 
experimentation, and of thinking about experiments.  
And all this vast articulated structure of a culture 
stood out in the open sun of day, accessible to anyone 
who wanted to join, who was willing and able to do the 
work; there were no secrets, there were no closed 
shops, and if every lab and every specialization had its 
politics, that was just politics . . . .  Science was a social 
construct, but it was also and most importantly its 
own space, conforming to reality only; that was its 
beauty.  Truth is beauty, as the poet had said, speaking 
of science.54 
 
 
 
These politics of science are “just politics” in the same sense that 
the rhetorics of science ― or of anything else ― can be “mere.”  
They are neither the ends sought nor the enterprises in their own 
right so much as the ways and means arranged as we proceed.  Our 
scholarly inquiries proceed principally as republics.  In evoking 
“the public sphere,” Fuller says less about governments than 
sciences, where “the very activity of constructing public things can 
sweep up large numbers of people and ideas, transforming them 
into a whole somewhat greater than the parts.  This has been the 
traditional argument for participatory democracy:  not that it 
generates the best outcomes most efficiently but that it improves 
the society’s individual and collective intelligence.”55  A rueful 
irony about the laments that rhetoric of inquiry or rhetoric of 
science might displace the civic tradition is that republican 
principles of speech-in-action might never find more suitable and 
productive settings than the sciences. 
 
 
34 
 
This is why, to probe learning as a human (let alone an academic) 
activity, a philosopher of science like me would turn from the 
modern emphasis on logic toward the classical tradition of 
rhetoric.  It is also why a philosopher of science like Fuller would 
fault above all the influence of Thomas Kuhn’s largely anti-
republican tale of paradigmatic sciences.56  Kuhn legitimated the 
imposition of intellectual hegemonies in one discipline after 
another, and Fuller rightly decries this as dubious history become 
bad policy.57  It can dumb down disciplines and stultify sciences.  
Another irony is that Fuller seems to endorse paradigmatic 
hegemony for classical oratory as the exclusive intellectual core for 
disciplinized rhetoric.  At other moments, he knows better. 
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35 
 
Fuller worries that “rhetoric could turn into the chemistry of the 
humanities:  denying all intellectual pretension and happy to say, 
‘Let us begin with some false assumptions for practical purposes:  
suppose there were a public sphere . . .’”58  If the issue were 
disciplinary prosperity, as Simons faults some anti-globalists for 
assuming, we do well to notice that this path has not meant instant 
disaster for economics.59  Hegemonic, neo-classical economists 
suppose counter to fact that most individuals are almost entirely 
rational and most markets can be almost fully free.  Far from 
facing their demise as a discipline, as Fuller implies chemists 
might be doing someday soon, economists have worked with 
impressive (if perverse) effectiveness to expand their studies as the 
physics of the social sciences.  Fuller’s work seems influenced 
productively in many ways by his supposition that there is a public 
sphere; and even though I bring the disconcerting news that it 
’taint necessarily so, I would not deny any inquiries recourse to 
ideals and other counter-factual constructs.60  On the other hand, 
rhetoricians can improve disciplinary as well as other inquiries 
when they learn from the historical and social sciences about 
departures or alternatives for the classical public. 
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Notwithstanding the approved rhetorics, it is unclear how many 
neo-classical economists ― or classically inspired rhetoricians ― 
actually face the implausibility of their ideals.61  Some are (not so 
secretly) true believers.  Fuller defends this for disciplinary 
rhetoricians.  “How can you teach public speaking,” he asks, “if you 
do not believe that the public exists?”62  Well, you might try 
believing that there are many publics, mostly partial.  These 
challenge speakers and teachers to learn the distinctive properties 
of the publics they address.  This is why details about Iran and 
Islam loom large in Zickmund’s account of the Khomeini rhetoric.  
It is why McLeod tells us so much about malls, courts, and 
trademarks.  It is why we may compare popular horror to westerns 
in making sense of Bush policies.  This can even illuminate what 
we each do with the Swiss and Chevrel engine for rhetorical 
invention.  Of these five authors, I am the only one who is parsing 
specifically civic rhetoric in the republican sense, let alone with 
distinctively classical concepts.  Yet the family resemblances ― and 
dependences ― among all seven contributions to this issue of 
Poroi are strong.  They share topics, principles, virtues, and 
devices.  The family can be called rhetorical analysis and 
invention.  It is not exactly a discipline, but any discipline might do 
well to marry into it, and every inquiry might get better by coming 
to know it. 
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